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P UBLIC H EA LTH A ND BIOS EC URIT Y

The Limits of Government
Regulation of Science

A transparent institutional review process
will balance scientiﬁc freedom and national
security better than publication restrictions.

John D. Kraemer1,2 and Lawrence O. Gostin2*

L

ast summer, two research teams
funded by the National Institutes of
Health genetically modif ied H5N1
avian influenza vir uses, making them
capable of eff icient respiratory transmission between ferrets. Ferrets are thought
to be a good animal model for inﬂuenza in
humans. A small number of genetic changes
might be able to convert the presently zoonotic H5N1 virus into a pathogen with dangerous pandemic potential—transmissible

ology and results could become a blueprint
for bioterrorism (1).
The U.S. government’s request not to
publish key scientiﬁc ﬁndings sparked considerable controversy. To many researchers, knowledge about what mutations enable
respiratory transmission is essential to surveillance of and early action against variants of H5N1. They worry that government
intrusion into scientif ic innovation would
discourage vital research. However, security

The court ruled that federally funded scientiﬁc research,
especially at universities, should be free from prior restraint—
calling into question the validity of CUI conditions on
research grants.
from human-to-human, with a >50% casefatality rate. The National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which
advises the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), recommended that
two journals, Science and Nature, redact
key information before publication. The
NSABB and HHS expressed concerns that
published details about the papers’ method1
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advocates believe the greater risk is that the
mutated virus could escape or that knowledge about these mutations could get into the
wrong hands. They suggest that research of
this kind should not be funded or undertaken
in the ﬁrst place. Where, as here, the research
has already been conducted, they urge scientiﬁc journals not to publish any sensitive
methods or results (1).
The HHS request reveals a troubled relationship between security and science. This is
not the ﬁrst time a government has requested
that a journal not publish information. In
1979, the U.S. Department of Energy secured
an injunction against the magazine The Progressive to prevent the publication of an article

about building a hydrogen bomb, even though
the information was in the public domain; the
injunction was later vacated when the article
was published elsewhere (2). In 2005, the
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences refused to comply with an HHS request
to decline publishing a mathematical model
of botulism in the milk supply (3). The H5N1
case, however, is the ﬁrst time government has
sought to redact information after an institutionalized HHS review process.
Constitutional Limits on Government
Restrictions of Scientiﬁc Publications

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution affords considerable protection to
political, artistic, and scientiﬁc expression,
that could trigger “strict scrutiny” by the
Supreme Court (4). The court is most vigorous in reviewing government restraints
on speech in advance of publication, which
it calls “prior restraints.” Prior restraints are
uniquely threatening to First Amendment
values because they prevent ideas from ever
being heard (5).
Had the government compelled the H5N1
researchers to cease research or the journals
to withhold publication—whether through
the force of law or by creating adverse consequences such as loss of funding—it could
have violated the First Amendment. Even
informal systems of restraint can be unconstitutional, such as a government threat to
prosecute publishers (5). In this case, however, HHS’ request, by its own terms, was
nonbinding, and the journals had discre-
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tion whether or not to comply (6). Given
the absence of legal force or undue inducements or penalties, the government’s request
to withhold information does not violate the
First Amendment.
There are situations in which a government has the authority to block scientif ic
communications. The clearest case is when
research has been properly classiﬁed under
federal law and the person seeking to communicate f indings obtained it under the
terms of a security clearance—whether they
are still working for the government or not,
so long as procedural requirements are met
(7). Although a researcher is obliged to keep
classiﬁed information conﬁdential, publishers who obtain that information lawfully have
a right to publish. In the Pentagon Papers
case, the Supreme Court held that President
Nixon did not overcome the “heavy presump-

on research grants. The wider the scope of
CUI conditions, the more likely that courts
will invalidate them (4).
The Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional
conditions” doctrine holds that government
may not place conditions on public funding that require the recipient to surrender
First Amendment rights. Thus, government
has no obligation to provide research funding, but if it chooses to, it cannot restrain the
free expression of researchers without a compelling state interest. For example, a federal
appellate court recently struck down HHS
guidelines requiring recipients of AIDS prevention funding to pledge their opposition to
prostitution, reasoning that it was an unconstitutional condition (10).
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
however, is hard to decipher. For example, the
Supreme Court upheld HHS prohibitions on

Could the public obtain sensitive data that have been redacted
from publications through a FOIA request? If so, governmental
requests to redact sensitive information would be fruitless.
tion” against prior restraint when he sought
to prohibit publication of classiﬁed materials.
The court found that an undeﬁned concept of
“security” did not “abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the First Amendment” (8).
It is far less clear whether government
may suppress the publication of research conducted with government funding when the
results are “controlled unclassiﬁed information” (CUI) [sometimes referred to as “sensitive but unclassiﬁed” (SBU)] under conditions set by government grants or contracts. Traditionally, the federal government
restricted communication about basic science research only through classif ication.
However, CUI restrictions have become more
common, and no court has directly addressed
their constitutionality. Although it is unclear
how often CUI clauses include a prepublication review requirement, research suggests
that they occur with some regularity (9).
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr.
University v. Sullivan is the most pertinent
case for evaluating CUI restrictions. Stanford
University challenged an NIH conﬁdentiality clause that required the university to seek
prior approval before publishing preliminary
ﬁndings about artiﬁcial heart research to protect the public from unvalidated research ﬁndings. The court ruled that federally funded
scientiﬁc research, especially at universities,
should be free from prior restraint—calling
into question the validity of CUI conditions
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the use of family planning funds to counsel
women regarding abortion, reasoning that
government is entitled to subsidize one protected right (family planning), while refusing
to subsidize analogous rights (abortion counseling) (11). The court similarly upheld the
government’s right to withhold funding to any
public university that denied access to military recruiters, even though the universities
claimed it violated their freedom to disapprove of the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell”
rule. The court said the law neither denied the
institutions the right to speak nor required
them to say anything (12).
Scientiﬁc Publication from Countries
Subjected to U.S. Economic Sanctions

In the past, the federal government has
impeded scientif ic publication processes,
not because of articles’ content but rather
because the authors were from countries
against which the United States had imposed
economic sanctions. The Department of
Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Foreign Assets Control
(OFAC) enforces these economic sanctions.
For a brief period in 2003, OFAC restricted the
review process for scientiﬁc papers submitted from countries sanctioned by the United
States (13). In particular, OFAC informed the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) that, although its journals could
subject papers from sanctioned countries to
peer review, they could not make prepub-

lication edits without a speciﬁc license. In
essence, OFAC argued that editing a paper
was providing a service to foreign authors in
violation of trade embargoes. In 2004, OFAC
reversed that decision and allowed normal
scientiﬁc editing to occur (14). Had OFAC
not reversed itself, First Amendment challenges against the policy likely would have
prevailed (15).
Access to Sensitive Data Under the Freedom
of Information Act

A functioning democracy requires that citizens be able to access information in the
government’s possession, but not if access
poses an unacceptable security risk. The
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) balances these concerns by affording access to
federal agency records unless the records
fall within a statutory exemption. Federal
agencies support much of the research in the
United States, including both of the recent
H5N1 studies. Could the public obtain sensitive data that have been redacted from publications through a FOIA request? If so, governmental requests to redact sensitive information would be fruitless.
FOIA applies only to “agency records,”
so a threshold issue is whether university
research data acquired under a grant constitute
an agency record. In 1980, the Supreme Court
ruled that research data produced under an
NIH grant and used in regulatory proceedings
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
did not constitute an agency record subject
to FOIA because it was retained by the nongovernmental grantee. The court found that
FOIA required the agency to either produce
or obtain permanent custody of the data (16).
The “Shelby amendment,” enacted in
1999, expanded public access to data produced at universities and other nonprof it
research entities under federal grants. The
public can request the data if they were produced under a federal grant and “cited publically and ofﬁcially by the Federal Government in support of an agency action that has
the force and effect of law” (17). Federal agencies could take care not to ofﬁcially cite highly
sensitive data, thereby avoiding a successful
FOIA request. However, it is not always simple or easy to refrain from referencing sensitive research. The NIH, for example, might
reasonably refer to the H5N1 research as justiﬁcation for revising biosecurity policies.
Even if sensitive data do become part of
an agency record, FOIA provides the federal
government with ample authority to refuse
a request on security grounds. FOIA provides nine exemptions under which records
that would otherwise have to be disclosed
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may be withheld, one of which is for “matters that are speciﬁcally authorized under criteria established by an executive order to be
kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and are in fact properly classiﬁed pursuant to such an executive order”
(18). Through this exception, Congress has
acknowledged broad executive authority to
classify records so long as it is done lawfully
pursuant to an executive order.
President Obama’s 2009 Executive Order
13526 revises existing classiﬁcation standards (19). Although it was designed to
reduce the amount of classiﬁed materials,
the executive order affords agencies considerable discretion to classify on security
grounds. Consistent with prior policy, the
executive order mandates that “basic scientiﬁc research information not clearly related
to the national interest shall not be classiﬁed.” However, the order permits the classiﬁcation of “scientiﬁc, technical, or economic
matters relating to the national security,” provided that disclosure is reasonably expected
“to cause identiﬁable or describable damage
to the national security.” Furthermore, agencies may classify data that meet the executive order’s standards even if the data were
not classiﬁed at the time of the FOIA request
(19). Thus, federal agencies have wide
authority to prevent the release of research
information through a FOIA request simply
by classifying it, provided that there are legitimate national security justiﬁcations.
In 2010, President Obama issued a further executive order stating that CUI is not
automatically exempt from FOIA (20). Thus,
to ensure that sensitive biological research
information is not disclosed, agencies would
have to classify it. [Certain nonbiological
research, such as nuclear energy, is automatically exempt from FOIA, as are the locations
where select biological agents are held (21).]
Some research data also might be protected
under FOIA exemptions for trade secrets
or predecisional deliberative memoranda
within the government, but these options are
limited (22).
The law, then, draws a distinction between
classiﬁed and controlled unclassiﬁed information. However, from a constitutional perspective, it would be troubling if the result
turned solely on the label the government
placed on the data. If the result did turn on the
label, the government could simply relabel
research from CUI to classiﬁed and thus prohibit its dissemination. Although decisions to
classify can be challenged, prevailing is difﬁcult, and unnecessary classiﬁcation is common (23). This appears to place too much discretion in the hands of public ofﬁcials.

The problem of government discretion is
compounded by highly inconsistent practices
among federal agencies in the classiﬁcation
systems they use. There is inconsistency of
structure (the labels attached, such as classiﬁed, CUI, SBU, or other terminology), as well
as in the application of that structure to individual documents (no clear standard exists
for deciding whether to classify particular
information). In short, the line between classiﬁed and CUI remains unclear, as agencies
struggle to apply President Obama’s executive orders (24).
Balancing Scientiﬁc Freedom, Constitutional
Values, and Biosecurity

The federal government has the power to
prevent the dissemination of sensitive lifesciences research, but there are good reasons to exercise that power sparingly. The
current system of deliberation by a federal
expert advisory board and HHS-issued voluntary recommendations is preferable to formal government mandates. Although we do
not have all the data, the NSABB process in
the H5N1 cases appears reasonable, given
that unredacted publication could enable bad
actors with scientif ic skill to replicate the
studies, with profoundly harmful effects. The
federal government has promised to share the
researchers’ methods and conclusions with
scientists with a need to know, which substantially advances scientiﬁc objectives.
Can the review process for high-risk biologic research be improved further? The
NSABB’s origins can be traced to the socalled Fink report issued in 2004 by the
National Research Council (21). However,
vital aspects of the Fink report have not been
implemented. In particular, the Fink report
proposed an institutional review process for
biological “experiments of concern”—those
falling into seven research classes, making
the pathogen considerably more attractive
as a bioterrorism agent (e.g., by enhancing
virulence or transmissibility or by rendering
vaccines ineffective). This approach was patterned on the Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) required by NIH for recombinant
DNA research at institutions receiving federal funding, which generally have been considered to be successful (21).
HHS, in partnership with institutions,
will have to ensure that the IBC model works
effectively: (i) institutions must develop the
requisite expertise to review dual-use research
of concern; (ii) HHS must specify the categories of research requiring institutional
review—minimally including the seven types
of high-risk experiments; and (iii) HHS must
set clear and consistent standards for institu-

tional review. If IBCs are formally designated
to conduct the institutional review function,
HHS will have to clarify whether NSABB
will guide and oversee the process (21). In
addition, because IBCs may recommend
that researchers voluntarily restrict access to
methods or results in some instances, it will
be important for HHS to develop a system for
managing access to sensitive data and for disseminating it to those with a need to know in
a fair manner.
If HHS improves its functioning, the institutional review process can ensure a sound
balance between scientif ic freedom and
national security. A fair, transparent process
undertaken by research institutions, with a
balanced approach to scientiﬁc beneﬁts and
public safety, together with HHS guidance
and oversight of high-risk research, is preferable to government constraints on scientiﬁc
information by force of law.
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